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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal and state criminal defendants often seek to avoid responsi-
bility for their crimes by putting the actions of government officials on
trial.' Defense efforts in this regard range from pretrial motions to sup-
press illegally-derived evidence, 2 to trial arguments implicitly or explic-
itly seeking "jury nullification" of a criminal statute to send a message to
government officials. 3  The entrapment defense, which applies to
instances where the government induces a defendant who is otherwise
* Attorney, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice. The views expressed in this
Article are solely those of the author and should not be construed as representing the views of the
United States.
1. See generally ALAN M. DERSHOWrz, THE BEST DEFENSE (1982).
2. See, e.g., Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 156 (1990) (excluding evidence obtained
by officials in violation of the Fifth Amendment); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)
(excluding evidence obtained by officials in violation of the Sixth Amendment); Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2139 (1993) (excluding evidence obtained by officials in violation of
the Fourth Amendment).
3. Federal Judge Jack B. Weinstein defines jury nullification as "occur[ing] when a jury-
based on its own sense of justice or fairness-refuses to follow the law and convict in a particular
case even though the facts seem to allow no other conclusion but guilt." Jack B. Weinstein,
Considering Jury "Nullification": When May and Should the Jury Reject the Law to Do Justice,
30 Am. ChuM. L. REv. 239, 239 (1993). A jury's power of "nullification" is deeply rooted, but
courts should not instruct the jury that it has such power. Id. at 241-43, 250. See, e.g., United
States v. Krzyske, 836 F.2d 1013, 1021 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 832 (1988); United
States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 408 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973); United
States v. Boardman, 419 F.2d 110, 116 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970); Tom
Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COL. L. REv. 79, 139 n.226
(1988).
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not predisposed to commit a crime,4 is perhaps the most traditional
means by which criminal defendants ask juries to condemn the govern-
ment's conduct.
This Article examines the "entrapment by estoppel" defense,5 or, as
it is sometimes called, the " 'official statement' mistake of law"
defense.6 Entrapment by estoppel differs markedly from the traditional
entrapment defense because a defendant need not show that a govern-
ment official "induced" his conduct but only that the official offered an
honest, albeit mistaken, opinion that the conduct was lawful.7 Similarly,
the defense differs from the "outrageous government misconduct"
defense that some courts have recognized as a matter of substantive due
process in cases where, even though the defendant was criminally
predisposed, the government induced the crime or participated in it
through means that "shock the conscience. '
Defendants in several recent cases have successfully invoked
entrapment by estoppel. Consider the following three cases:9
4. See, e.g., Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1540 (1992); United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958); Sorrells
v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1932). A defendant may claim he was entrapped and
simultaneously deny that he committed the offense. See Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58,
66 (1988).
5. The Supreme Court has never accepted the entrapment by estoppel label. See OPM v.
Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 426-427 (1990) (noting current debate about whether United States v.
Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp. ("PICCO"), 411 U.S. 655 (1973), created an estoppel against
the government).
6. See Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Criminal Law: "Official Statement" Mistake of Law
Defense, 89 A.L.R. 4th 1031 (1991) (collecting cases).
7. As one commentator explained, the facts in entrapment by estoppel cases "differ[]
significantly from the typical entrapment situation." Note, Applying Estoppel Principles in
Criminal Cases, 78 YALE L.J. 1046, 1046 (1969). The officials in entrapment by estoppel cases
"were known by the defendants to be government agents and had no design to deceive and entrap
the defendants, nor did they persuade the defendants to commit the criminal acts. Instead, they
merely gave their honest opinion that what the defendants proposed to do was not unlawful." Id.
at 1046-47.
8. Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that forcible pumping of
suspect's stomach violate due process because it shocked the conscience). The Supreme Court in
a plurality opinion has categorically rejected the existence of a due process defense of outrageous
government misconduct. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-91 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,
with Burger, C.J., and White, J.). Nonetheless, the concurring justices in Hampton refused to rule
out the existence of this defense in all cases. Id. at 491-95 (Powell, J., joined by Blackmun, J.).
Although such a defense is generally assumed to exist, some courts have questioned its viability.
See, e.g., United States v. Bontkowski, 865 F.2d 129, 131 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Miller,
891 F.2d 1265, 1271 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., concurring). The defense, however, only
rarely succeeds. Typically, the defendant must show that: "1) the government utilize[d]
unwarranted physical or mental coercion to effectuate the crime; or 2) the police completely
fabricate[d] the crime solely to secure the defendant's conviction." United States v. Emmert, 829
F.2d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 1987).
9. See discussion infra part IV.
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1. In Commonwealth v. Twitchell,10 two Christian Scientists par-
ents were convicted of involuntary manslaughter ("wanton or reckless"
conduct resulting in death) because they refused to allow surgery that
could have corrected their two-year old son's life-threatening medical
condition. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rejected the par-
ents' contention that a state statute protecting parental rights to provide
"spiritual" treatment is a defense to involuntary manslaughter charges.
Nonetheless, the court held that the state Attorney General's official
statements regarding the spiritual treatment statute, which were
recounted in a Christian Science publication, might be read as preclud-
ing an involuntary manslaughter prosecution. The Twitchell court held
that the parents should have been allowed to present an entrapment by
estoppel defense to the jury by showing that they reasonably relied on
the Attorney General's statements.
2. In United States v. Levin," an ophthalmologist was indicted for
Medicare fraud because he received "kickbacks" from lens manufactur-
ers that he did not reflect on his cost reports, which he submitted to
secure federal reimbursement for Medicare-covered cataract surgeries.
Although such kickbacks are unambiguously proscribed by the relevant
criminal statute, the Sixth Circuit upheld pretrial dismissal of the indict-
ment because the federal agency overseeing the Medicare program had
written informal letters seemingly allowing similar reimbursement prac-
tices in other cases. In his dissent, Judge Martin noted the lack of evi-
dence that the doctor even knew of the other letters and explained, in
any event, that the issue whether he reasonably relied on letters to differ-
ent Medicare providers was a question of fact that could only be deter-
mined by a trial jury.
3. In United States v. Hedges, 2 an Air Force procurement officer
responsible for billion-dollar defense contracts was convicted under a
federal conflict-of-interest statute for discussing employment opportuni-
ties with a defense contractor that later hired him. The defendant offered
evidence that he had consulted his military "Standards of Conduct Coun-
selor" about his employment discussions and that the counselor advised
him without ever suggesting that the employment discussions created a
conflict of interest. The district court excluded this defense evidence, on
the ground that the conflict-of-interest statute creates a strict liability
offense in which the defendant's state of mind is irrelevant. The Elev-
enth Circuit reversed. While agreeing with the district court that the
statute created a strict liability offense, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
10. 617 N.E.2d 609 (1993).
11. 973 F.2d 463 (6th Cir. 1992).
12. 912 F.2d 1397 (11th Cir. 1990).
1994]
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defense evidence should have been admitted under an entrapment by
estoppel theory.
Although defendants increasingly invoke entrapment by estoppel,
courts have not adequately considered basic questions such as: From
whence does entrapment by estoppel derive? What are the prerequisites
to entrapment by estoppel? Does it apply equally to crimes requiring
specific intent, general intent, and no intent at all? Does entrapment by
estoppel raise a question for a judge or a jury?
II. ENTRAPMENT BY ESTOPPEL CASELAW
As the Supreme Court recently explained, "[tihe general rule that
ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prose-
cution is deeply rooted in the American legal system."' 3 This rule, how-
ever, is not invariable. Some criminal statutes limit liability to "willful"
violations, which courts typically construe as "making specific intent to
violate the law an element of" the offense. t4 Even where a mistake of
law defense would not otherwise be cognizable, the Supreme Court has
held that prosecution may be precluded under the Due Process Clause
where government officials affirmatively, albeit mistakenly, assured
defendants that their conduct was legal. The three leading Supreme
Court cases, which lower courts have read as adopting an "entrapment
by estoppel" defense, are Raley v. Ohio,15 COx v. Louisiana,'6 United
States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp. ("PICCO" P).17
A. The Supreme Court Trilogy
In all three of the Supreme Court's purported entrapment by estop-
pel cases, the defendants claimed that a government official's erroneous
advice had misled them. In Raley, an Ohio commission chairman
informed the defendants that they could decline to answer the commis-
sion's questions when, in fact, the applicable Ohio immunity statute
actually eliminated their privilege against self-incrimination.' a The
Supreme Court reversed the contempt convictions. The Court, charac-
terizing the commission as "the voice of the State,"' 9 observed that it
had given the defendants "positive advice",2" and in so doing had
13. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991).
14. Id. at 200; see e.g., Ratzlaf v. U.S., 114 S. Ct. 655 (1994).
15. 360 U.S. 423 (1959).
16. 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
17. 411 U.S. 655 (1973).
18. 360 U.S. at 425.
19. Id. at 439.
20. Id. at 432.
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actively misled the defendants.2" The Court explained that while there
was no suggestion that the commission had any intent to deceive the
defendants, to sustain the judgments of conviction on such a basis after
the commission had acted as it did "would be to sanction an indefensible
sort of entrapment by the State-convicting a citizen for exercising a
privilege which the State had clearly told him was available to him."22
Similarly, the defendant in Cox was convicted of violating a state
statute prohibiting demonstrations "near" a courthouse even though "the
highest police officials of the city, in the presence of the Sheriff and
Mayor, in effect told the demonstrators that they could meet where they
did, 101 feet from the courthouse steps, but could not meet closer to the
courthouse."2 3 The Supreme Court, quoting Raley, reversed the defend-
ant's conviction on the ground that the Due Process Clause does not
permit such "an indefensible sort of entrapment by the State."'24 The
Court noted that "[o]bviously telling demonstrators how far from the
courthouse steps is 'near' the courthouse for purposes of a permissible
peaceful demonstration is a far cry from allowing one to commit, for
example, murder or robbery. 25
Finally, the defendant in PICCO claimed that he relied upon
agency regulations that (erroneously) allowed the discharge of industrial
pollutants into rivers if the discharge would not impede navigation.26 As
the Supreme Court characterized it, the defendant claimed he was
"affirmatively misled by the responsible administrative agency into
believing that the law did not apply in this situation."27 The Court con-
cluded that "to the extent that the regulations deprived PICCO of fair
warning as to what conduct the Government intended to make criminal,
we think there can be no doubt that traditional notions of fairness inher-
ent in our system of criminal justice prevent the Government from pro-
ceeding with the prosecution. 28 The Court did not frame its decision in
terms of "estoppel," but favorably quoted commentary using that term.2 9
The Court concluded that "the issues whether there was in fact reliance
and, if so, whether that reliance was reasonable under the circumstances
21. Id. at 438.
22. Id. at 425-26.
23. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 568-69, 571 (1965).
24. Id. at 571.
25. Id. at 569.
26. United States v. PICCO, 411 U.S. 655, 670-75 (1973).
27. Id. at 674.
28. Id. at 674.
29. Id. at 674 (citing Frank C. Newman, Should Official Advice Be Reliable?-Proposals as
to Estoppel and Related Doctrines In Administrative Law, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 374 (1953)); Note,
supra note 7, at 1046.
19941
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...must be decided in the first instance by the trial court."30
B. The Roots and Elements of the Supreme Court Trilogy
The entrapment by estoppel defense is, at least in part, constitution-
ally based. In Raley and Cox, the Supreme Court specifically ruled that
the Due Process Clause precludes convicting an individual for "exercis-
ing a privilege which the State had clearly told him was available to
him."'3' Reliance on the Constitution was necessary given that the
Supreme Court lacks supervisory authority over state prosecutions.32 In
PICCO, which involved a federal prosecution, the Court was not explicit
about the source of its ruling, but the citation to Raley and Cox33 sug-
gests that the rule had some constitutional underpinnings.
Moreover, although Raley and Cox did not use the term, the Court
in those cases employed what today could be labeled "substantive due
process" analysis. 34 Defendants claiming entrapment by estoppel are
not asking for additional "process"-they are most likely entitled to a
trial by jury under the Sixth Amendment-but instead are challenging
the substantive fairness of the prosecution itself. Thus, in Raley and
Cox, the Supreme Court construed the Due Process Clause as preventing
"an indefensible sort of entrapment by the State. ' 35  Similarly, in
PICCO, while the Court referred to a denial of "fair warning" to the
defendant,36 it ultimately relied on "traditional notions of fairness inher-
ent in our system of criminal justice. 3 7 An entrapment by estoppel
claim, therefore, requires a court to analyze whether, under all the cir-
cumstances of the case, fundamental fairness precludes conviction.
The Supreme Court has "defined the category of infractions that
violate 'fundamental fairness' very narrowly. 38 At least with respect to
entrapment by estoppel, this is correct. As the Court has explained,
"[w]hen the Government is unable to enforce the law because the con-
duct of its agents has given rise to an estoppel, the interest of the citi-
zenry as a whole in obedience to the rule of law is undermined.' 39 Thus,
Congress or state legislatures must define the elements of criminal
30. Id. at 675.
31. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 425-26 (1959); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571 (1965).
32. See Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475, 482 (1991).
33. See United States v. PICCO, 411 U.S. 655, 674 (1973).
34. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1446-47 (1993); see also Foucha v. Louisiana,
112 S. Ct. 1780, 1785 (1992); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).
35. Raley, 360 U.S. at 426; see also Cox, 379 U.S. at 571.
36. PICCO, 411 U.S. at 674.
37. Id. at 674-75.
38. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990); accord Estelle v. McGuire. 112 S.
Ct. 475, 482 (1991).
39. Heckler v. Community Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51. 60 (1984).
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offenses, prosecutors must execute the laws by deciding when to charge
individuals with such offenses, and grand and petit juries must serve as
the ultimate guardians against injustice. Courts should hesitate before
setting aside a conviction rendered in conformance with all the proce-
dural requisites of law and consistent with all the specific protections of
the Bill of Rights. Such setting aside cannot be justified simply because
it offends a judge's personal views of "traditional notions of fairness. '"40
Of course, courts should utilize the entrapment by estoppel doctrine
in cases where fundamental fairness dictates that it be applied. But
because the doctrine is such strong medicine, the doctrine should be
reserved for those cases where it is truly needed. An analysis of the
Supreme Court's trilogy of cases reveals at least four prerequisites to a
successful entrapment by estoppel claim.
The first prerequisite is the involvement of a government agent
with authority over the area in question. This is necessary as a matter of
constitutional law because the Due Process Clause, like other guarantees
of the Bill of Rights, is limited to "state action."41 Thus, for example,
the Court in Raley was careful to characterize the Ohio commission as
"the voice of the State."'42 The Court in Cox similarly emphasized that
the advice had been given by "the highest police officials of the city, in
the presence of the Sheriff and Mayor."43 Likewise, the Court in PICCO
deemed there to be "no question that PICCO had a right to look to the
Corps of Engineers' regulations for guidance" given that "[t]he Corps is
the responsible administrative agency under the [statute]."'
Second, the responsible government official must have made some
affirmative misrepresentation of law. In Raley, for example, the com-
mission gave "positive advice" that resulted in the "active misleading"
of the defendants.4 5 In Cox, the police officers gave the defendant an
"official grant of permission" to demonstrate where he did.46 In PICCO,
the responsible agency "affirmatively misled" the defendant through its
regulations.47 Likewise, the more recent Supreme Court case of OPM v.
Richmond, though outside the criminal law context, explained that
"[o]ur own opinions have continued to mention the possibility, in the
course of rejecting estoppel arguments, that some type of 'affirmative
40. PICCO, 411 U.S. at 674.
41. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1001 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S.
830, 839 (1982).
42. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 439 (1959).
43. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571 (1965).
44. PICCO, 411 U.S. at 674.
45. Raley, 360 U.S. at 432, 438.
46. Cox, 379 U.S. at 572.
47. PICCO, 411 U.S. at 674.
1994]
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misconduct' might give rise to estoppel against the Government."48
Requiring some affirmative agency action is necessary to prevent under-
cutting the well-established rule that "ignorance of the law or a mistake
of law is no defense to criminal prosecution."4 9 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court in PICCO noted that the defendant did not "contend...
that it was ignorant of the law or that the statute is impermissibly
vague."50
Third, the defendant must have reasonably relied on the govern-
ment official's misstatement of law. The Court in PICCO, for example,
remanded the case for the trial court to determine "whether there was in
fact reliance and, if so, whether that reliance was reasonable under the
circumstances." 51
The final, and most amorphous, prerequisite is that conviction must
be "unfair" under the circumstances. Thus, the Court in Raley and Cox
stressed the "indefensibility" of convicting the defendants.2 The
PICCO Court suggested that convicting the defendant would contravene
"traditional notions of fairness inherent in our system of criminal jus-
tice."53 While it could be argued that unfairness will always exist if the
first three prerequisites are established, the Supreme Court apparently
has not adopted this view. In Cox, the Court noted that "[o]bviously
telling demonstrators how far from the courthouse steps is 'near' the
courthouse for purposes of a permissible peaceful demonstration is a far
cry from allowing one to commit, for example, murder, or robbery."54
This Article suggests that the Court may balance the unfairness to the
defendant against the cost to society of estopping law enforcement,
especially with respect to serious crimes.
C. The Response of the Lower Courts
Federal courts of appeals have generally recognized the key prereq-
uisites to a successful entrapment by estoppel claim.55 Courts, for exam-
ple, require a government official to issue the pronouncement.56
48. OPM v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 421 (1990).
49. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991).
50. PICCO, 411 U.S. at 673-74.
51. Id. at 675.
52. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 426 (1959); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571 (1965).
53. PICCO, 411 U.S. at 674.
54. Cox, 379 U.S. at 569.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Levin, 973 F.2d 463, 468 (6th Cir. 1992) (prerequisites are "that
(1) a government [official] must have announced that the charged criminal act was legal; (2) the
defendant relied on the government announcement; (3) the defendant's reliance was reasonable;
and, (4) given the defendant's reliance, the prosecution would be unfair") (citing United States v.
Smith, 940 F.2d 710 (1st Cir. 1991)).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 986 F.2d 65, 69 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v.
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Obviously, statements of a private party cannot estop the government; 57
nor, in a federal prosecution, can statements of state or local officials
estop the federal government. 58 There is, however, disagreement as to
whether statements of federally-licensed gun dealers may estop the fed-
eral government. In United States v. Tallmadge,59 the Ninth Circuit held
that a gun dealer's statements may provide the basis for entrapment by
estoppel. In light of the Supreme Court's requirements for estoppel, this
decision seems wrong. Courts have never considered a person doing
business pursuant to a government license as a government official.' In
such a system, states would be liable for the negligence of every citizen
holding a drivers license. The government "normally can be held
responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive
power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or
covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the [govern-
ment]. ' '6' There was no evidence in Tallmadge to suggest that the fed-
eral government had encouraged the gun dealer to advise the defendant
that he could own a gun legally.
Second, federal courts have required some evidence that the gov-
ernment official made an affirmative misrepresentation as to the legality
of the action. 62  The Eighth Circuit has held that "the absence of an
explicit assurance of legality" is fatal to a successful entrapment by
Brebner, 951 F.2d 1017, 1027 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Austin, 915 F.2d 363, 366 (8th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1626 (1991).
57. United States v. Clark, 986 F.2d 65, 69 (4th Cir. 1993) (private museum official's
statements could not bar prosecution for improperly selling tiger skins) (citing United States v.
Austin, 915 F.2d 363, 366 (8th Cir. 1990)). In United States v. Tallmadge, 829 F.2d 767, 773-75
(9th Cir. 1987), the court estopped the federal government from prosecuting the defendant for
possessing firearms that a federally-licensed gun dealer said he could possess. The court also
noted that the defendant's private attorney and state officials had given him similar advice. In
another case, the Ninth Circuit explained "[riather than authorizing a defendant's reliance on non-
federal officials, we analyzed this evidence in regard to the second requirement of the entrapment
by estoppel test, namely the reasonableness of the defendant's reliance on the licensed firearms
dealer." United States v. Brebner, 951 F.2d at 1027.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Etheridge, 932 F.2d 318, 321 (4th Cir.) (claim may not be based
on advice given by state trial judge), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 323 (1991); United States v. Hurst,
951 F.2d 1490, 1499 (6th Cir.) (entrapment by estoppel claim may not be based on statements of
state law enforcement officials), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1952 (1992); United States v. Bruscantini,
761 F.2d 640, 641-42 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 904 (1985); United States v. Allen, 699
F.2d 453, 458 n.1 (9th Cir. 1982) (state parole officer).
59. 829 F.2d 767, 773-75 (9th Cir. 1987). See United States v. Clegg, 846 F.2d 1221, 1224
(9th Cir. 1988) (panel deemed itself bound by Tallmadge "[w]hatever our disagreements may be
with the court's ruling" in that case); see also United States v. Billue, 994 F.2d 1562, 1568-69
(11 th Cir.) (holding that federal firearms license does not make gun dealer a federal official), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 939 (1993); United States v. Austin, 915 F.2d 363, 366-67 (8th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1626 (1991).
60. See, e.g., Moose Lodge, Inc. v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
61. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
62. United States v. Brebner, 951 F.2d 1017, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 1991).
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estoppel claim. 63 The mere failure to advise the defendant that his con-
duct was wrongful cannot suffice. If courts "were to accept [defense]
contention[s] that mere nonfeasance in law enforcement was tantamount
to official approval of illegal acts and entrapment, there would be
scarcely a speeding ticket not subject to due process challenge. '
Third, federal courts have required that the defendant reasonably
relied on the statements by the responsible government official. As one
court stated, "the defendant must show that he relied on the official's
statement and that his reliance was reasonable in that a person sincerely
desirous of obeying the law would have accepted the information as true
and would not have been put on notice to make further inquiries. 65 In
at least one case, however, this requirement was not applied as strictly as
it should have been. In United States v. Levin,66 the court acknowledged
the reliance requirement,67 but found that the "defendants initiated no
inquiry of their own concerning the legality of" their conduct.68 Simi-
larly, the dissenting opinion noted that "there apparently is no evidence
that [defendants] saw these [agency] letters before the' grand jury
indicted [them]." 69 Nonetheless, the majority upheld an entrapment by
estoppel claim based on a vague notion of constructive reliance.7°
Finally, courts have recognized that the entrapment by estoppel
defense will be sustained only where prosecution would otherwise be
"unfair."'" One court explained, "[e]ven if [it] were to find the technical
elements of estoppel present, [a] court can refuse to apply the doctrine
when policy considerations so demand."72 This additional element of
unfairness, however, has not been considered in detail. Generally,
where courts have found that the other elements of the defense have
63. United States v. LaChapelle, 969 F.2d 632, 637 (8th Cir. 1992); see also, United States v.
Clark, 986 F.2d 65, 69-70 (4th Cir. 1993) (defense rejected where statements of federal official
were, at best, equivocal).
64. United States v. Hurst, 951 F.2d 1490, 1499 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1952
(1992).
65. United States v. Weitzenhoff, 1 F.3d 1523, 1534 (9th Cir. 1993). A defendant will not be
entitled to rely on the defense where he is in collusion with corrupt government officials. See
Note, supra note 7, at 1058 ("The purpose of criminal estoppel is the protection of those whom the.
government has confused as to the state of the law; and collusion, bribes, and favoritism by
officials are outside its scope-no matter how much the defendant may have relied on such
misconduct.").
66. 973 F.2d 463 (6th Cir. 1992).
67. Id. at 468.
68. Id. at 465.
69. Id. at 472 (Martin, J., dissenting).
70. See id. at 465 (deeming it "apparent" that federal government approval of similar conduct
"was circulated throughout the targeted professional medical community by manufacturers'
representatives and sales personnel").
71. See id. at 468 (citing United States v. Smith, 940 F.2d 710 (1st Cir. 1991)).
72. United States v. Hall, 974 F.2d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 1992).
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been proven, they have assumed it would be unfair to convict the
defendant.
III. UNRESOLVED ISSUES
Although the preceding section illustrates some disagreement
among courts regarding application of the entrapment by estoppel doc-
trine to particular cases-for example, as to whether a gun dealer is a
federal agent capable of binding the government or whether a defendant
reasonably relied on a misstatement-courts have failed to address two
broader issues. First, for what types of crimes is the defense available?
Courts have recognized that, because "entrapment by estoppel rests upon
principles of fairness [and] not [a] defendant's mental state," it may be
raised even as to crimes requiring specific intent.73 But, is the converse
also true? Can the defendant raise an entrapment by estoppel defense to
a crime that requires that he have acted with specific intent, or is the
defense superfluous in that context? Second, in cases where the defense
is properly raised, is it a question for a judge or a jury to decide?
A. Does the Defense Apply to Specific Intent Crimes?
Courts have neglected to consider whether the Constitution requires
that an 'entrapment by estoppel defense be cognizable in all criminal
cases. When a court considers and upholds the defense even though the
statutory elements of an offense are established, it is necessarily holding
the statute unconstitutional as applied. In essence, the court invalidates
application of the statute to a defendant as contrary to "traditional
notions of fairness inherent in our system of criminal justice."74 Before
considering and upholding an entrapment by estoppel claim, courts
should decide whether an available statutory defense exists that would
obviate the unfairness. Considering the possible statutory defenses first,
accords with the Supreme Court's practice "not [to] pass on the constitu-
tionality of an Act of Congress if a construction of the Act is fairly
possible, or some other nonconstitutional ground fairly available, by
which the constitutional question can be avoided."7 5
Some criminal statutes, particularly those limiting liability to "will-
ful" violations, "mak[e] specific intent to violate the law an element of"
73. Smith, 940 F.2d at 714 (citing United States v. Hedges, 912 F.2d 1397, 1405 (11th Cir.
1990)).
74. United States v. PICCO, 411 U.S. 655, 674 (1973); see also United States v. Hall, 974
F.2d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Levin, 973 F.2d 463, 468 (6th Cir. 1992); Smith,
940 F.2d at 710.
75. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 92 (1985).
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the offense.76 For example, the federal conspiracy statute makes it a
crime to conspire to commit a federal offense or "to defraud the United
States, or any agency thereof."77 This language has been construed as
"reach[ing] 'any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, obstructing or
defeating the lawful function of any department of Government.' "7T8
The entrapment by estoppel defense, therefore, should have no applica-
tion to a defendant who acted with the specific intent to defraud the
United States. Stated otherwise, defendants who rely in good faith on
assurances of government officials that their conduct was legal will not
have acted with the statutorily-proscribed "purpose of impairing,
obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any department of Gov-
ernment."7 9 By allowing good faith reliance to negate an element of the
offense, the entrapment by estoppel defense is not necessary, as the stat-
ute itself protects against fundamentally unfair convictions.
Even in cases where the government is not the intended victim, the
need for the constitutional defense with respect to other specific intent
crimes may not exist. For example, two of the most commonly charged
federal criminal statutes prohibit any "scheme or artifice to defraud" that
is executed through the United States mails or interstate wire facilities."0
A defendant's good faith reliance on governmental assurances that his
conduct was legal would negate any intent to defraud, and preclude con-
viction under the mail or wire fraud statutes, even where a private party
is the victim. In this regard, the leading jury instruction manual offers
the following instruction with respect to specific intent crimes:
The "good faith" of Defendant - is a complete defense to the
charge of - contained in [Count - of] the indictment because good
faith on the part of the defendant is, simply, inconsistent with
[describe required mental state, e.g., "the intent to defraud", "the
intent to obtain money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises"] alleged in that charge. 1
When courts give the above instruction, the entrapment by estoppel
defense is superfluous because a defendant who reasonably relied on
government assurances cannot have the requisite mental state for con-
viction. The instruction notes that, in determining whether the defendant
acted with the requisite intent, "the jury must consider all of the evi-
76. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200 (1991); see also, e.g., Ratzlaf v. U.S., 114 S.
Ct. 655 (1994).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1993).
78. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 128 (1987) (citations omitted).
79. Id.
80. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1993).
81. 1 EDWARD J. DEVrrTr ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 19.06, at 797
(1992).
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dence received in the case bearing on the defendant's state of mind."8 2
Moreover, where specific intent is an element of the offense,
whether the defendant reasonably relied on government assurances can
only be determined at trial. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
preclude "speaking motions" in which defendants challenge the suffi-
ciency of evidence underlying an indictment.8 3 One reason for this dif-
ference between a criminal case and a civil case in which summary
judgment would be permitted is that, in a criminal case, a grand jury
typically has found probable cause for the facts underlying the charged
offense. As the Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed, most
recently in United States v. Williams, federal courts have no power to
dismiss indictments based on insufficiency of evidence relied on by the
grand jury.84
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b) expressly limits pretrial
motions to dismiss to those matters that are "capable of determination
without trial of the general issue."85 Accordingly, in United States v.
Knox, 86 the Supreme Court held that Rule 12(b) prohibited a defendant
charged with making false statements on a wagering tax form from
asserting a pretrial claim that requiring gamblers to file such forms
improperly coerced them into choosing between incriminating them-
selves or lying. The Court stated that, "the question whether Knox's
predicament contains the seeds of a 'duress' defense, or perhaps whether
his false statement was not made 'willfully' as required by § 1001, is
one that must be determined initially at his trial."87 In addition, the
Supreme Court's decision in Serfass v. United States88 provides similar
precedent.89 Federal courts of appeals have also held that a Rule 12(b)
pretrial motion may not be the basis for controverting the factual allega-
82. Id.
83. See 1 CHARLES A. WRIGrr, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 194, at 714 (1982).
84. 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1745-46 (1992).
85. FED. R. CrIM. P. 12.
86. 396 U.S. 77 (1969).
87. Id. at 83; see also id. at 83 n.7 (Rule 12(b) "indicates that evidentiary questions of this
type should not be determined on such a motion.").
88. 420 U.S. 377 (1975).
89. In Serfass, the district court dismissed the defendant's indictment. He was charged with
willful failure to report for induction into the armed services. The dismissal was based on the
court's conclusion, upon consideration of a pretrial affidavit and defendant's selective service file,
that the Draft Board had not adequately explained, why the defendant was not entitled to
conscientious objector status. The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim that a
government appeal of this dismissal order was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court
held that jeopardy never attached because the defendant had not been "put to trial before the trier
of facts." Id. at 389. The Court explained that, in considering a pretrial motion to dismiss an
indictment, "the District Court was without power to make any determination regarding
[defendant's] guilt or innocence." Id.
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tions of an indictment. 0
Where an indictment charges that the defendant acted "willfully" or
with another specific intent inconsistent with reasonable reliance on
government assurances, the defendant should not be allowed to contro-
vert the charge until trial. If the jury convicts the defendant, the entrap-
ment by estoppel defense cannot apply because the jury's verdict would
be inconsistent with the prerequisites to that constitutional defense.
B. Should a Court or Jury Decide the Issue?
As previously discussed, entrapment by estoppel is a constitutional
defense. It is reserved for cases in which, though the prosecution proves
all elements of the statutory offense, conviction remains fundamentally
unfair, and therefore in violation of the Due Process Clause. Thus, it
differs from a traditional entrapment defense, which is "rooted... in the
notion that Congress could not have intended criminal punishment for a
defendant who has committed all the elements of a proscribed offense
but was induced to commit them by the Government.""1 As a constitu-
tional defense, entrapment by estoppel is more analogous to the "outra-
geous government" conduct defense. 92 Federal courts of appeals
uniformly hold that the merits of an outrageous government conduct
defense should be decided by the court as a question of law rather than
by a jury as a question of fact.93
90. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 919 F.2d 795, 797 (1st Cir. 1990) (applying the
"general rule" that "when a pretrial motion raises a question of fact that is intertwined with the
issues on the merits, resolution of the question of fact thus raised must be deferred until trial");
United States v. Ayarza-Garcia, 819 F.2d 1043, 1048 (1 1th Cir.) (noting that "a pretrial motion to
dismiss the indictment cannot be based on a sufficiency of evidence argument because such an
argument raises factual questions embraced in the general issue"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 969
(1987); United States v. King, 581 F.2d 800, 802 (10th Cir. 1978) (reinstating indictment where
"dismissal was in effect a determination of guilt made at a point in the proceedings when the
district judge was without jurisdiction to render it"); United States v. Mann, 517 F.2d 259, 267
(5th Cir. 1975) (reversing pretrial dismissal based on "evidence outside of the indictment" because
"such evidence is irrelevant to a determination of whether the indictment itself is legally
sufficient"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976); Universal Milk Bottle Serv. v. United States, 188
F.2d 959, 961-62 (6th Cir. 1951) (holding that defendants charged with illegal price-fixing could
not challenge the indictment with official bulletins and affidavits showing that they could not have
fixed milk prices because the federal Agriculture Secretary had already established them).
91. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973); see also Mathews v. United States,
485 U.S. 58, 66 (1988).
92. See United States v. Smith, 940 F.2d 710, 714-16 (1st Cir. 1991) (recognizing parallels
between entrapment by the estoppel and outrageous government conduct defenses).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Henderson-Durand, 985 F.2d 970, 973 & n.4 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 164 (1993); United States v. Hudson, 982 F.2d 160, 163 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 100 (1993); United States v. Payne, 962 F.2d 1228, 1232 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 306 (1992); United States v. Sotelo-Murillo, 887 F.2d 176, 182 (9th Cir. 1989); United States
v. Swiatek, 819 F.2d 721, 726 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 903 (1987); United States v.
Nunez-Rios, 622 F.2d 1093, 1098 (2d Cir. 1980).
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One reason why the entrapment by estoppel defense is more appro-
priate for a court is that "[e]ven if [it] were to find the technical elements
of estoppel present, [a] court can refuse to apply the doctrine when pol-
icy considerations so demand." 94 This policy consideration is important
because "entrapment by estoppel rests on a due process theory which
focuses on the conduct of the government officials rather than on a
defendant's state of mind."95 Criminal juries should not be asked to
weigh "policy considerations" involving the government's conduct.
Despite these factors strongly supporting judicial resolution of an
entrapment by estoppel claim, there are cases which suggest that such a
claim raises a jury question.96 One recent law review article accepted
the view that a "defendant using [the entrapment by estoppel] defense
requests a jury instruction that reasonable reliance upon the legal advice
of a public official charged with interpreting the law is a defense."97 In
addition, an earlier note concluded that "[t]he criminal estoppel defense
is heavily fact-oriented" and, therefore, "must be tried to the jury in
some form."98 However, a jury question arises only where the defend-
ant's specific intent is an element of the offense. Indeed, in such cases
there is no need for a constitutional entrapment by estoppel defense
(predicated on the need to avoid fundamental unfairness) because a
defendant who is affirmatively misled will lack of the requisite criminal
intent.
Making entrapment by estoppel an issue for the court rather than
the jury benefits the prosecution in some respects but the defense in
others. The prosecution is generally helped by the fact that a sympa-
thetic jury is not invited to nullify the perceived harshness of non-spe-
94. United States v. Hall, 974 F.2d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 1992).
95. United States v. Brebner, 951 F.2d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 1991).
96. United States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858, 860 (9th Cir. 1991); see also United States v.
LaChapelle, 969 F.2d 632, 637-38 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Ramos, 961 F.2d 1003, 1006
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 364 (1992); United States v. Hedges, 912 F.2d 1397, 1405-06
(11th Cir. 1990).
97. Fred W. Bennett, From Sorrells to Jacobson: Reflections on Six Decades of Entrapment
Law, and Related Defenses, In Federal Court, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 829, 862 (1992) (citing
United States v. Hedges, 912 F.2d 1397, 1404 (1lth Cir. 1990)).
98. Note, supra note 7, at 1056 n.34. The student note applies a fact versus law dichotomy
and advocates a hybrid approach in which some elements of the entrapment by estoppel defense
are decided by the jury and others by the court. Id. at 1056-57 nn.34-37. That the defense is
"heavily fact-oriented," however, does not justify requiring a partial jury determination. Many
fact-dependent issues (e.g., suppression issues, the outrageous government misconduct defense)
are decided solely by the court prior to trial. Moreover, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
allow pretrial resolution of defenses "capable of determination without trial of the general issue."
FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b). The dividing line, therefore, is not whether a defense raises factual issues,
but rather whether it is inextricable from the elements of the offense, which can only be decided
by the jury. Because the entrapment by estoppel defense, properly construed, is wholly separate
from the statutory elements of an offense, it is a question of law for the court.
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cific intent statutes. On the other hand, the defense is benefitted because
the court has greater power to act as a fact-finder regarding the issue of
reliance without viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution.99 If the trial court finds for the defendant on the issue,
however, the prosecution may appeal."° In contrast, the government
cannot appeal an adverse jury verdict."'
IV. RECONSIDERING ENTRAPMENT BY ESTOPPEL CASELAW
The general principles related to an entrapment by estoppel
defense, and attendant questions, are illustrated in the three recent cases
highlighted in the introduction.' 012 In the first case, Commonwealth v.
Twitchell, the court correctly permitted a reliance defense at trial, but
erred in terming it entrapment by estoppel.'1 3 In United States v. Levin,
the second case, the court erred both in allowing the introduction of a
reliance defense prior to trial and in identifying such a defense as entrap-
ment by estoppel. 1°4 Finally, in the third case, United States v. Hedges,
the court correctly recognized an entrapment by estoppel claim, but
99. Where the defendant claims that the prosecution failed to prove an element of the offense,
the narrow judicial inquiry is "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
100. See 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1990) ("In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie
to a court of appeals from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an
indictment or information or granting a new trial after verdict or judgment, as to any one or more
counts, except that no appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the United States
Constitution prohibits further prosecution."). Where an entrapment by estoppel claim is resolved
prior to trial, as it should be under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b), the Double Jeopardy Clause does not
restrict the government's appeal because jeopardy never attached. See Serfass v. United States,
420 U.S. 377, 394 (1975) (Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar government appeals of pretrial
dismissals). Where the court grants an entrapment by estoppel claim after jeopardy has
attached-i.e., after the jury has been empaneled and sworn-the double jeopardy issue becomes
more complicated. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 29 (1978). In such cases, the general rule is
that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars government appeals of any judgment regarding the merits of
"some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged." United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977); accord Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 143 (1986).
The thesis of this Article, however, is that entrapment by estoppel is a constitutional defense
unrelated to the elements of the offense. If this thesis is correct, even a mid-trial judgment
upholding the defense arguably would be appealable under Section 3731 (and not barred by the
Double Jeopardy Clause), because it would not represent a finding that the government failed to
prove any elements of the offense. Cf. United States v. Torkington, 874 F.2d 1441, 1444-45 (1 lth
Cir. 1989) (government entitled to appeal mid-trial judgment purportedly entered under Fed. R.
Crim. P. 29, because the judgment of "acquittal" was "based on prosecutorial misconduct rather
than on insufficiency of the evidence").
101. See generally Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
102. See supra pp. 629-30.
103. Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609, 618-19 (Mass. 1993).
104. United States v. Levin, 973 F.2d 463, 468-70 (6th Cir. 1992).
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erred in deeming it a trial defense.'0 5 The analytical errors in these cases
are not simply a matter of semantics. These errors adversely affect the
procedural and substantive rights of both the prosecution and the
defense.
A. The Involuntary. Manslaughter Case
In Commonwealth v. Twitchell, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, citing entrapment by estoppel caselaw, held that Christian Sci-
ence parents convicted of involuntary manslaughter should have been
allowed to show at trial that they relied on statements by the state Attor-
ney General.' 0 6 Arguably, these statements would have precluded pros-
ecution for failure to provide medical services because of religious
beliefs. The court may have reached the correct result, but it erred in
failing to examine whether the evidence was admissible under state law.
The Massachusetts common law offense of involuntary manslaugh-
ter encompasses "wanton or reckless" conduct resulting in death. 0 7
Although the nuances of Massachusetts law are beyond the scope of this
Article, it seems that the parents would be entitled to offer evidence of
those factors that influenced their thinking to demonstrate that their con-
duct was not "wanton or reckless." If the parents had consulted a doctor
and been advised that the medical risks of the operation outweighed its
possible benefits, then the evidence would be admissible to demonstrate
their decision to decline the operation was not wanton or reckless.
Indeed, the Twitchell court cited evidence that the parents had consulted
a Christian Science practitioner, nurse, and church official during the
course of their child's illness. 08 If the parents had relied on the state
Attorney General's opinion regarding the legality of purely spiritual
treatment,' °9 there is no apparent reason why such evidence would not
bear on whether their actions were wanton or reckless.
The Twitchell court's failure to consider the admission of reliance
evidence under state law was not simply a case of unnecessarily decid-
ing a constitutional issue. By resting its decision on entrapment by
estoppel, the court placed "the burden on the defendants to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence the facts that support the affirmative
defense."' 10 Although the court was correct to consider entrapment by
105. United States v. Hedges, 912 F.2d 1397, 1404-06 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
106. 617 N.E.2d 609 (1993).
107. Id. at 613-14 (discussing Massachusetts caselaw).
108. Id. at 612, Obviously, the source of the advice will affect its weight. Reliance on a
physician will be more reasonable than reliance on a fortune teller.
109. Giving special treatment to religious practices potentially implicates the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. The Twitchell court, however, did not consider these First
Amendment issues. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d at 614.
110. Id. at 620 n.17.
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estoppel as an affirmative defense in which defendants have the burden
of proof,"' the court neglected to consider whether reasonable reliance
embodied by that defense was already encompassed in the elements of
the offense. If evidence of the defendants' reliance was relevant to
whether they had acted wantonly or recklessly, as the prosecution was
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, then the court should have
required the prosecution to negate the defendants' reasonable
reliance. "12
If the evidence of the defendants' reliance were irrelevant as a mat-
ter of state law, then the Twitchell court would have been justified in
resorting to the constitutional defense of entrapment by estoppel."t 3 One
issue the court failed to explicitly address is whether the entrapment by
estoppel defense should be available for a serious crime such as involun-
tary manslaughter. In Cox, the Supreme Court suggested that the
defense may not apply to certain crimes, stating "[o]bviously telling
demonstrators how far from the courthouse steps is 'near' the courthouse
for purposes of a permissible peaceful demonstration is a far cry from
allowing one to commit, for example, murder, or robbery."' " 4 The
Twitchell court, therefore, should not have recognized an entrapment by
estoppel defense without considering whether the theory applies to
crimes such as manslaughter.
As one commentator suggests, "[e]stoppel can never be a valid
defense to a charge of an heinous crime" or to "almost any crime involv-
ing substantial personal injury. '"" ' This generalization, however, cuts
too broadly. Massachusetts does not criminalize all conduct which
causes death, but only "reckless or wanton" conduct." 6 Reasonable reli-
ance on governmental advice is the antithesis of wanton or reckless con-
duct. Thus, it is fundamentally unfair to convict defendants under such a
theory without allowing evidence that they conformed to the advice of a
111. Note, supra note 7, at 1056.
112. See generally In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (Due Process Clause requires
prosecution to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt).
113. If reliance evidence were admissible under state law, and if the jury nonetheless convicted
the parents, the constitutional entrapment by estoppel defense would not apply because conviction
would not violate "traditional notions of fairness inherent in our system of criminal justice."
United States v. PICCO, 411 U.S. 655, 674 (1973).
114. 379 U.S. 559, 569 (1965).
115. Note, supra note 7, at 1060-61. The note defines "heinous" crimes as those that "involve
such markedly cruel physical treatment of other persons as to involve shocking disregard for the
dignity of life and person." Id. at 1060 n.53. The note apparently would not deem manslaughter
as a heinous crime but would include it as another type of crime-one "involving substantial
personal injury"-for which an entrapment by estoppel defense should generally be unavailable.
See id. at 1060 n.54, 1061.




responsible state official. Notwithstanding any state rule of evidence to
the contrary, the Constitution requires that the court allow defendants to
offer evidence in their own defense that would negate an essential ele-
ment of the crime charged." 7
B. The Medicare Fraud Case
In United States v. Levin,118 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit upheld the pretrial dismissal of an indictment that
charged a doctor and others with Medicare fraud. The court held that
pretrial dismissal was appropriate because a federal Medicare agency
had issued informal letters approving marketing practices purportedly
similar to the "kickback" scheme in which the doctor had partici-
pated. 9 The court's holding was premature. The Medicare fraud stat-
ute requires the government to prove that a defendant "knowingly and
willfully" solicited or received a kickback or other illegal remuneration
in return for purchasing Medicare-reimbursed items. 120 The statute thus
demands proof that the defendant acted with the specific intent to
defraud the government by accepting illegal kickbacks. 2 Evidence that
the defendant acted in good faith in reasonable reliance on government
assurances that his conduct was lawful would be inconsistent with the
mental state required for conviction of Medicare fraud. The Levin court
erred in employing an entrapment by estoppel theory and in allowing the
defendant's reliance claim to be resolved prior to trial. The indictment
in Levin charged that the doctor had acted with the requisite criminal
intent, 22 and the Supreme Court has consistently held that federal courts
have no pretrial power to dismiss indictments based on the insufficiency
of evidence relied on by the grand jury.' 23 Contrary to the majority's
117. It is, of course, "not the province of a federal [reviewing] court to reexamine state court
determinations on state law questions." Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475, 480 (1991). The Due
Process Clause, however, as well as the Sixth Amendment, do prevent states from "arbitrarily
exclud[ing] material portions of [defense] testimony." Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987)
(citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)). Defendants could claim that
restricting evidence of reasonable reliance is so arbitrary, in a case where they must be proven to
have acted wantonly or recklessly, as to violate their constitutional rights to offer evidence in their
own defense.
118. 973 F.2d 463 (6th Cir. 1992).
119. Id. at 470.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)(B) (1993).
121. Cf. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200 (1991) (discussing general meaning of term
"willfully" as used in criminal tax statutes). One court has referred to the Medicare fraud statute
as containing an "unusually high scienter requirement." United States v. Bay State Ambulance
and Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874 F.2d 20, 33 (1st Cir. 1989).
122. Levin, 973 F.2d at,469.
123. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1745-46 (1992).
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suggestion in Levin,124 no case holds that courts may dismiss indict-
ments before trial based on extrinsic evidence inconsistent with the
grand jury's allegations. The case most heavily relied upon by the Levin
majority held that a defendant charged with illegal wiretapping could
raise the legal argument that the wiretap statute did not cover the tapping
of a spouse's phone-by supplementing (not controverting) the indict-
ment with the additional undisputed fact that the phone in question
belonged to his wife.' 25 Similarly, the other cases cited by the Levin
majority involved affirmative defenses that could be resolved through
undisputed facts without controverting essential elements of the
indictment. 26
It is not surprising, given the precipitous nature of the Levin court's
action, that the majority and dissent disagreed about whether the factual
elements of the entrapment by estoppel defense had been established.'27
124. Levin, 973 F.2d at 469-70.
125. United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976). The Jones court stressed that the
defendant "did not contradict the essential allegations in the indictment" and emphasized that he
would not have been allowed to do so. Id. at 665 & n.7. It illustrated the limits of a Rule 12(b)
motion as follows:
Professor Moore cites United States v. J.R. Watkins Co., 16 F.R.D. 229 (D. Minn.
1954) as a case which illustrates "[tihe distinction between a defense which may be
decided before trial on the basis of affidavits and exhibits, and one which requires a
trial of the general issue." 8 Moore 1 12.04 at 12-27. In Watkins the Court was
presented with two separate defenses in a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, one based on
the statute of limitations and the other disputing the Government's interpretation of
facts alleged in the indictment. The Court disposed of the statute of limitations
defense before trial on the basis of affidavits and exhibits but deferred ruling on the
other defense because it contradicted the allegations of the indictment and went "to
the very foundation of [the] prosecution." 16 F.R.D. at 234.
Jones, 542 F.2d at 665 n.7.
126. See United States v. Covington, 395 U.S. 57, 59-60 (1969) (Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination); Kentucky v. Long, 837 F.2d 727, 749-50 (6th Cir. 1988)
(constitutional immunity of FBI agent from state prosecution for federally-authorized acts).
127. The majority stated:
From the undisputed operative facts it is apparent that (1) [the federal government]
and its duly designated representatives declared the sales promotion program, which
was the predicate for the indictment, to be legal; (2) the [defendants] relied upon
[the government's] announcement; (3) the defendants' reliance was reasonable; and
(4) prosecution for violation of the controversial counts of the indictment would be
unfair.
Levin, 873 F.2d at 468. The dissent, however, characterized the factual elements of estoppel as
follows:
the following facts were and are still in dispute with respect to the entrapment by
estoppel defense: (1) whether an agent of the United States told Levin, as opposed
to any other individuals, that the conduct at issue was allowed under the statute; (2)
whether Levin actually relied on the government's letters; and (3) whether Levin's
reliance was reasonable especially in light of the fact that there was abundant gov-
ernment material that stated that the particular type of conduct that Levin engaged in
was, in fact, illegal. These disputed facts go to the heart of the entrapment by estop-
pel defense and, thus, involve the ultimate determination of guilt or innocence.
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The key factual issue in Levin was whether the doctor reasonably relied
on government assurances that his kickback arrangement was legal. The
Levin court should have allowed this issue to be resolved at a trial where
the prosecution had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the doctor had knowingly and willfully acted to defraud the Medi-
care program. Because a defendant acting in reasonable reliance on offi-
cial assurances cannot properly be found to have the specific intent to
defraud the government, there is no need for a constitutional entrapment
by estoppel defense to guard against fundamental unfairness.
C. The Conflict of Interest Case
In United States v. Hedges,2 ' the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the conviction of an Air Force procure-
ment officer who had improperly negotiated future employment oppor-
tunities with a defense contractor. Applying the entrapment by estoppel
doctrine, the court held that the officer should have been allowed to
introduce evidence that his military ethics counselor had advised him
without suggesting that the employment negotiations created a conflict
of interest. Unlike in Twitchell and Levin, however, such evidence was
clearly irrelevant to the charged statutory offense. In construing a prede-
cessor conflict of interest statute, the Supreme Court held that "the
knowledge of [the federal employee's] superiors and their approval of
his activities do not suffice to exempt [the employee] from the coverage
of the statute." '29
For a defendant's good faith reliance on federal officials' informal
advice to preclude a conflict of interest conviction, there must be a con-
stitutional bar. The Hedges court was therefore correct in analyzing the
issue as one of entrapment by estoppel. Because a defendant's good or
bad faith is not an element of the offense or a statutory defense, how-
ever, the court erred in suggesting that the issue was a jury question. 30
An amendment to the conflict of interest statute following the criti-
cal events in Hedges clarifies the respective responsibilities of the judge
and jury in the entrapment by estoppel context. Recognizing the strict
liability nature of the offense, Congress prescribed misdemeanor penal-
Id. at 473 (emphasis omitted).
128. 912 F.2d 1397 (11th Cir. 1990).
129. United States v. Mississippi Valley Generat. Co., 364 U.S. 520, 561 (1961); cf. Crandon
v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 165 (1990) ("Neither good faith, nor full disclosure, nor exemplary
performance of public office will excuse the making or receipt of a prohibited payment.")
(interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 209). The conflict of interest statute provides a formal procedure for
obtaining written waivers. 18 U.S.C. § 208(b) (1993). Defendant Hedges never claimed to have
obtained such a formal waiver.
130. Hedges, 912 F.2d at 1405-06.
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ties except in those cases where the defendant acted "willfully."'1 31
Henceforth, when a defendant, who is charged with "willfully" engaging
in a conflict of interest, proffers evidence that he conformed to official
advice, courts should allow this evidence regarding the essential element
of willfulness. If the jury finds that the defendant acted willfully, the
constitutional entrapment by estoppel defense becomes superfluous and
the only judicial issue is "whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found ...beyond a reasonable doubt" that the defendant acted
willfully.1 32 The court should undertake plenary review of whether the
conviction is fundamentally unfair and thus violative of due process only
when the jury acquits the defendant of a felony conflict-of-interest
offense, and convicts the defendant of a lesser-included misdemeanor
offense based on non-willful conflict.
V. CONCLUSION
Entrapment by estoppel is a constitutional defense that should be
reserved for those rare cases in which convicting a defendant guilty of
all elements of a criminal offense would be fundamentally unfair.
Where a criminal statute already requires specific proof of culpable
intent, the constitutional defense is superfluous because a defendant who
acted in good faith reliance on government advice that his conduct was
legal cannot have intended to commit the offense. In such cases, the
factual issue whether the defendant reasonably relied on government
advice is a jury question. In addition, the prosecution has the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to com-
mit the offense. Courts that have applied the entrapment by estoppel in
such cases disadvantage the defendant by misplacing the burden of proof
on the defendant.
Entrapment by estoppel should only be a defense when the statute
does not require specific proof of culpable intent. The court must con-
sider whether conviction of a defendant who reasonably relied on gov-
ernment advice would be fundamentally unfair and thus violative of due
process. Because this issue is separate from the elements of the offense,
and because upholding the defense essentially means that the statute is
unconstitutional as applied, the issue is a question of law for the court
rather than the jury.
131. See 18 U.S.C. § 216 (1993) (setting maximum one-year term of imprisonment unless
defendant acted willfully, in which case five-year maximum term applies).
132. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
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